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THE SCHOFIELD/GUNNER DECISIONS AND
EPISCOPAL CHURCH PROPERTY-SPLITTING
LITIGATION: CONSIDERING PROPOSED
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE LITIGATION PROCESS
AND THE NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
DOCTRINE, TEN YEARS ON
TIMOTHY D. WATSON
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Episcopal Church in the United States
has seen a spate of parishes leaving the Church. Many of these
departing parishes have attempted to take property with them as
they leave and continue to operate independently or realign themselves with a different denomination. The Episcopal Church maintains that this property is held by the parishes on behalf of the
national Church, and has generally been successful in obtaining a
return of the property through legal action. In deciding these suits,
state courts have skirted carefully around the contours of ecclesiastical questions; many state courts, following the Supreme Court,
have adopted a Jones v. Wolf neutral principles of law approach
for determining church property questions. Some commentators,
after examining the application of the neutral principles approach
in the Episcopal Church property-splitting context, have argued
that the results reached by the courts are unjust, and have made
their own suggestions for how to improve the adjudication process
to obtain different results. This Note examines some of these suggestions in the context of the lawsuits surrounding the Diocese of
San Joaquin, California, which span over a decade. The suggestions considered here find no place in the San Joaquin litigation,
and are simply not applicable in many situations. Even if they
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were applicable, the suggestions would not improve the neutral principles approach, would create incongruities with other areas of law,
would muddle court analysis, and would not create more just results
in church property-splitting litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, parishes in the Diocese of San Joaquin (California)
were some of the first to split off from the Episcopal Church in the
wake of alleged theological changes, preparing the way for a vast
array of litigation and resulting scholarship.1 When the Diocese’s
bishop reassigned the Diocesan property to himself for the use of
the breakaway parishes, the Episcopal Church sued to recover the
property.2 Nearly ten years later, in July 2016, after a spate of
embittered, nationwide litigation, the California Supreme Court
declined to take the San Joaquin case, leaving the Appellate Court’s
April 2016 decision in favor of the Episcopal Church intact.3
Part I of this Note presents a history of the Episcopal
Church, setting a historical context for schism and identifying the
assets typically in question during a suit, as well as attempting
to provide a more robust historical and cultural basis for the conflicts, a topic which has been somewhat ignored in prior legal
scholarship. Part II looks at the development of judicial involvement in church property-splitting in the United States, following
the progression of the common law from the initial deferential approach to the modern “neutral principles of law” doctrine, beginning with some of the earliest church property-splitting decisions
and continuing through to the Diocese of San Joaquin lawsuits.
Part III highlights a selection of scholarship, which is aimed at
making suggestions to improve the church property-splitting process in an attempt to make the results more just. It then examines
whether any of these suggestions were incorporated in the judicial
decisions resulting from the San Joaquin property controversy,
which is both one of the first, and, at this point, one of the last
1

Laurie Goodstein & Carolyn Marshall, Episcopal Diocese Votes to Secede
from Church, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03
/us/03episcopal.html.
2 Pat McCaughan, San Joaquin Diocese, Episcopal Church file suit to regain
property, EPISCOPAL CHURCH (Apr. 25, 2008), https://www.episcopalchurch.org
/library/article/san-joaquin-diocese-episcopal-church-file-suit-regain-property
[https://perma.cc/U9HD-4TBB].
3 ENS Staff, California Supreme Court upholds ruling in San Joaquin property case, EPISCOPAL NEWS SERVICE (July 14, 2016), https://www.episcopalnews
service.org/2016/07/14/california-supreme-court-upholds-ruling-in-san-joaquin
-property-case/ [https://perma.cc/B4PG-8G7X].
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Episcopal Church property-splitting lawsuits resulting from the
conflicts of the mid-2000s. Finally, for each suggestion examined, it
will ask one of two questions: if the suggestion was included in some
way in the court’s decision, how did it affect, or not affect, the outcome
of the suit?; or, if the suggestion was not included in the court’s decision, would its inclusion likely have had an effect on the outcome?
I. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
The Episcopal Church is a Christian religious organization
established in the United States in 1784.4 It is a member of the
4

Diocese of Oregon, History of the American Church, EPISCOPAL CHURCH
(1999), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/history-american-church [https://
perma.cc/VD2U-PMCA]. The Episcopal Church is also known as the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of America (PECUSA or ECUSA). IAN
S. MARKHAM & C.K. ROBERTSON, EPISCOPAL QUESTIONS, EPISCOPAL ANSWERS
84–85 (2014) (“In the early twentieth century, the official name of the corporate
organization became ‘The Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America’ ... although the
corporate name remains for official purposes, the Church ... [uses] as its selfdesignation ‘The Episcopal Church’ or TEC ....”). What would become The Episcopal Church began as a mission of the Diocese of London in the Church of
England. DAVID HEIN & GARDINER H. SHATTUCK, JR., THE EPISCOPALIANS 35–36
(Praeger Publishers, Denominations in America No. 11, 2004) (“Anglicanism
in the colonies was forced to operate as a largely disunited collection of parishes
under the distant supervision of the bishop of London.”). A priest from the
Church of England, the Reverend Robert Hunt, accompanied the Virginia
Company of London’s expedition to North America in 1607 as the expedition’s
chaplain. SAMUEL WILBERFORCE, A HISTORY OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN AMERICA 25 (1844). This expedition founded the Jamestown settlement in the Colony of Virginia (later Jamestown, Virginia); the first Church of
England sacramental service was celebrated there soon after, with Rev. Hunt
“administering the holy eucharist [sic] to the united company upon the 14th of
May, 1607, the day after their first landing.” Id. at 22. The Diocese of London,
with the support of English voluntary organizations such as the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK) continued to send clergyman and monetary
support to the church in the North American colonies until the outbreak of the
Revolutionary War in 1775. HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra, at 17, 22, 35–41; Diocese
of Oregon, supra (discussing American clergy maintaining ties with the SPG
during the American Revolutionary War). The Church of England, both historically and presently, is synonymously referred to as the “Anglican Church,”
“Anglican” meaning “of England,” from the Latin Anglii (English: Angles), the
name given to the Germanic inhabitants of Britain. Church History, ANGLICAN,
http://anglican.org/church/ChurchHistory.html [https://perma.cc/L8W9-WYUF];
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worldwide Anglican Communion, an organization composed of a
number of national churches around the world under the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury.5 The Episcopal Church is
headed by a Presiding Bishop, but, unlike, for example, the Roman
Catholic Church, which has a very top-down leadership structure,
the individual parishes that make up the Episcopal Church hold
much of the primary power for self-determination in practice.6
The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, Angle, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Angle-people [https://perma.cc/RVC5-C42N].
Due to its historical association with the Church of England, and its present-day
participation in the Anglican Communion, the terms “Episcopal” and “Anglican” are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to the Episcopal Church. See
THOMAS A. RUSSELL, COMPARATIVE CHRISTIANITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO A
RELIGION AND ITS DIVERSE TRADITION 185 (2010); see, e.g., Schofield v. Superior
Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (showing the court referring to the Episcopal Church as a “regional Anglican church[ ].”).
5 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(citing Schofield v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)).
The Archbishop of Canterbury, in addition to being head of the Anglican Communion, is also the Primate of the Church of England. Id.; see also R. Gregory Hyden,
Welcome to the Episcopal Church, Now Please Leave: An Analysis of the Supreme
Court’s Approved Methods of Settling Church Property Disputes in the Context of
the Episcopal Church and How Courts Erroneously Ignore the Role of the Anglican
Communion, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 541, 562–68 (2008) (discussing the function
of the Anglican Communion and its potential application to property disputes).
6 Governance of the Episcopal Church, HOUSE OF DEPUTIES OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH, http://houseofdeputies.org/governance-episcopal-church/ [https://perma
.cc/46K5-PBLQ] (“All major decisions affecting the life of the Episcopal Church
are made jointly by lay people, clergy and bishops. Parishes elect a vestry to
govern the affairs of the parish ....”). As the canons of the Episcopal Church
give property rights to the national church rather than individual dioceses or
parishes, the organization of the Episcopal Church has been the key point in
contention in property-splitting lawsuits. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198
P.3d 66, 75 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)) (in lawsuits “involv[ing] a hierarchical structure, i.e., ‘a religious congregation which
is itself part of a large and general organization of some religious denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views and
ecclesiastical government’ ... ‘we are bound to look at the fact that the local
congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by
its orders and judgments.’”). The Roman Catholic Church in the United States
has not experienced recent schisms of the same extent as those of the Episcopal
Church, but in property disputes where the neutral principles of law approach
is used, the more hierarchically focused polity of the Roman Catholic Church
has been a militating factor. See, e.g., Blaudziunas v. Egan, 961 N.E.2d 1107,
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This might, at first glance, appear to be a confederal form of government, in which the dioceses, as an association of governments,
delegate certain powers to a central organization (the General Convention).7 However, the appearance of decentralization is deceptive:
[The decentralization] does not make the church structurally
confederal. There is no essential division of power between the
General Convention and the dioceses. In fact, there is no limit
at all upon the Convention’s governing powers, unless it be the
ancient canons and the necessity for conformity with the Catholic Faith; but these are interpreted finally by the General Convention alone. Thus, the government is unitary. 8

Each individual parish is run by a vestry, which is a board
composed of a number of laypeople elected by the parish; the members of the vestry elect a rector, who must be an ordained priest.9
The Episcopal Church spreads across seventeen countries, but the
bulk of its membership is located in the United States.10 For administrative purposes, the geographic regions of the Episcopal
Church are broken down into units called dioceses; a bishop is
appointed to run the affairs of each diocese.11 The Episcopal Church
currently contains 109 dioceses.12 Each diocesan bishop, in turn,
1108 (N.Y. 2011) (“No act or proceeding of the [trustees of the parish] shall be
valid without the sanction of the Archbishop.”).
7 DAVID L. HOLMES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 55 (1993).
8 Id. at 55 (quoting James A. Dator, The Government of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America: Confederal, Federal, or Unitary?
245 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University)).
9 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55.
10 About Us, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/about
-us [https://perma.cc/RX6K-6CJR] (listing number of countries with non-domestic
dioceses); Baptized Members by Province and Diocese 2005–2015, EPISCOPAL
CHURCH (2016), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/documents/baptized_mem
bers_by_province_and_diocese_2005-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQU7-WGJ5]
(listing 1,779,335 members in domestic dioceses versus 137,847 members in
non-domestic dioceses in 2015).
11 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 71 (Cal. 2009). The diocesan
bishop typically serves two roles, as a diocese is both “the sphere of jurisdiction
of a bishop” and “the district under the pastoral care of a bishop.” Diocese,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/53084
?redirectedFrom=diocese#eid [https://perma.cc/4NJ5-8874].
12 About Us, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/about
-us [https://perma.cc/RX6K-6CJR].
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participates in and reports to the decision-making body of the
Episcopal Church, the General Convention.13 These three levels
make up the “three-tiered” hierarchy of the Church: (from bottom
to top) parish, diocese, General Convention.14 Because of this allocation of power, there is necessarily a tension between the
top-down leadership of the bishops in the General Convention and
the bottom-up control of the individual parishes.15 The General
Convention passes and periodically updates the Constitution and
Canons, the binding rules governing the functions of the Episcopal
Church.16 When a diocese or parish applies to join the Episcopal
Church, it agrees to adopt a constitution and canons which match
those of the Episcopal Church.17
Schism is nothing new in the Episcopal Church. The Church
of England, from which the Episcopal Church emerged after the
American Revolution, was a product of the English Reformation.18 In
1534, England, spearheaded by Henry VIII, declared that the
churches in England, largely Roman Catholic and under the control of the Pope in Rome, now belonged to the English crown and owed
loyalty solely to the king.19 In the intervening 500 years, the Anglican
Church has seen a continuous stream of separation, notably including the separation of the Methodist Church20 and (arguably)
13

Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55.
New v. Kroeger, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 469–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
15 See supra text accompanying notes 6–14 (discussing these two forms of
leadership).
16 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55 (citing Huber v. Jackson, 96 Cal. Rptr.
3d 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)); Constitution & Canons: Together with the Rules
of Order, 2015, EPISCOPAL CHURCH (2016), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files
/documents/2015_candc.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBF-8QD4].
17 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55.
18 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 172–73.
19 Act of Supremacy 1534, Public Act, 26 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (Eng. and Wales) (“the
King’s Majesty justly and rightfully is & oweth to be the supreme head of the
Church of England ... and shall have ... all ... jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and commodities.”); Statute in Restraint of Appeals
1532, 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12 (Eng. and Wales) (making the King the final legal
authority on matters within national borders and refusing domestic citizens
the ability to appeal to the Pope or hierarchy of the Church in Rome, on both
religious and non-religious matters).
20 HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra note 4, at 27 (“the Methodists separated from
Anglicanism in 1784 ....”).
14
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the Baptist Church,21 the second and first largest protestant denominations in America, respectively.22 The Episcopal Church, in
particular, had also seen its share of separations prior to the
twenty-first-century turbulence. The Reformed Episcopal Church
split off from the Episcopal Church in the late nineteenth century
due to perceived ecclesiological changes in the Episcopal Church.23
Several groups broke off in the twentieth century, including, inter
alia, the American Episcopal Church in 1968 and the Anglican
Catholic Church in 1977.24
The last half of the 1990s and the first decade of the
twenty-first century proved a breaking point for the largest separation in the history of the Episcopal Church.25 In 2003, the Diocese of New Hampshire elected Gene Robinson to serve as their
21

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BRACKNEY, BAPTISTS IN NORTH AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 22 (2006) (arguing that the most persuasive view of the
historical origins of the Baptist movement is one that describes the Baptist
movement, apropos of the Anabaptists, as arising from English Separatism of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
22 Fifteen Largest Protestant Denominations, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 7,
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/chapter-1-the-changing-religious
-composition-of-the-u-s/pr_15-05-12_rls_chapter1-03/ [https://perma.cc/L4ZH
-6ZEY]. In 2014, the Baptist Church (composed of, inter alia, the Southern Baptist
Convention, the American Baptist Churches USA, and the National Baptist
Convention) had 8.2 percent of the US population, the United Methodist
Church had 3.6 percent, and the Episcopal Church had 0.9 percent. Id.
23 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 172–73. The original break-off party left the
Episcopal Church largely over concerns of the “Romanizing” influence of the
Oxford Movement in England. Id. at 173–74. See MIRANDA KATHERINE HASSETT,
ANGLICAN COMMUNION IN CRISIS: HOW EPISCOPAL DISSIDENTS AND THEIR AFRICAN
ALLIES ARE RESHAPING ANGLICANISM 30 (2007) (“The nineteenth century brought
tensions between waves of evangelicalism within the church, inspired by revivals
around the country, and a movement of liturgically oriented, traditionalist Episcopalians that influenced the church strongly in the direction of Anglo-Catholicism. From that time on, the Episcopal Church has been dominated by ... an
‘Anglo-Catholic hegemony.’”).
24 MARTYN PERCY, POWER AND THE CHURCH: ECCLESIOLOGY IN AN AGE OF
TRANSITION 167–68 (1998); see also HOLMES, supra note 7, at 173.
25 The departure of the Episcopal Diocese of South Carolina alone took
22,953 members out of the Episcopal Church. About Us, THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, http://www.dioceseofsc
.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/GA5V-YJXZ]. The split off of the Reformed Episcopal
Church in the nineteenth century, in contrast, had only 1,500 communicants
six months after its separation. ANNIE DARLING PRICE, A HISTORY OF THE
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bishop.26 Robinson was the first openly gay, non-celibate priest to
be elected as a bishop in the Anglican tradition.27 Historically, the
Episcopal Church, along with almost all Christian churches, had
declared non-celibate homosexuals to be living sinfully,28 but recent revisions of Episcopal church canons reversed this stance
and allowed parishes first to bless gay unions,29 then later to perform weddings for gay couples.30 Some Episcopalians saw this as
the final straw in a church which, they argued, had been rapidly
becoming more socially, politically, and theologically liberal.31
This led many dissenting members to break off their affiliation
with the Episcopal Church, beginning with individual parishes
voting to leave the Church.32 The 7,000-member Diocese of San
FORMATION AND GROWTH OF THE REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH 1873–1902
154 (1902).
26 STEPHEN BATES, A CHURCH AT WAR: ANGLICANS AND HOMOSEXUALITY 6
(2004).
27 Rebecca Leung, Gay Bishop ‘Being Honest’, CBS NEWS (Mar. 4, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gay-bishop-being-honest-04-03-2004/ [https://per
ma.cc/D2CX-6ZFE].
28 See generally ROBERT E. HOOD, SOCIAL TEACHINGS IN THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH 144–59 (1990) (discussing the historical development of views on sexuality within the Episcopal Church).
29 Alison Leigh Cowan, A Moratorium on Weddings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/14/nyregion/a-moratorium-on-weddings.html.
30 George Conger, The Episcopal Church approves religious weddings for
gay couples after controversial debates, WASH. POST (July 1, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/01/why-the-episcopal-church
-is-still-debating-gay-marriage/?utm_term=.5fa242080c63 [https://perma.cc
/7QGT-VWC8].
31 See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 56 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016); see also HASSETT, supra note 23, at 1 (“A growing socially conservative and religiously evangelical orientation among the leaders and members of
[some Episcopal churches], along with moves to the left by the larger Episcopal
Church, created a divide that eventually proved irreconcilable.”). This included
issues such as biblical inerrancy and the epistemic foundation of faith, the ordination of women as priests, the appointment of female priests as bishops, the
acceptability of non-celibate homosexual relationships, ecumenical and interfaith
relations, and Church affiliation with particular political or economic positions.
See, e.g., id. at 96–98 (discussing reactions to Episcopal calls for unconditional
third-world debt relief).
32 Laurie Goodstein & Carolyn Marshall, Episcopal Diocese Votes to Secede
From Church, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03
/us/03episcopal.html.
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Joaquin, California, was the first diocese to break off from the
Episcopal Church in the wake of Robinson’s election.33 Under the
leadership of Bishop John-David Schofield, the diocese voted “overwhelmingly” to secede from the Episcopal Church.34 Over the next
few years, many other dioceses and parishes chose to follow a path
similar to the one taken by San Joaquin.35 Upon leaving the Episcopal Church, many of the parishes and dioceses, including the
Diocese of San Joaquin, took title and possession of the church
property with them, setting the stage for the ensuing litigation.36
While some of the formerly Episcopal churches chose to remain independent,37 many chose to join the Anglican Church of
North America, an organization formed in 2009 to maintain the
Episcopal style of worship while rejecting the alleged theological
and social changes that had led to the split.38 The Anglican Church
33

Id.
Id.
35 Laurie Goodstein, Episcopal Split as Conservatives Form New Group, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/04episcopal.html.
36 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58 (“[former Diocese of San Joaquin Bishop]
Schofield began retitling the 27 parcels of real property in dispute by granting
them to The Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin, a Corporation Sole.”); see also
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, A Church Divided: Ruling Ends Va.’s Episcopal Battle,
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/10
/150351713/a-church-divided-ruling-ends-va-s-episcopal-battle (discussing the
real property kept by several breakaway Virginia parishes).
37 Report from the Task Force for Provincial Affiliation: Provincial Affiliation
with the Anglican Church in North America, THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, https://web.archive.org/web/201
60912090217/http://www.diosc.com/sys/about-us/affiliation/729-report-from-the
-task-force-for-provincial-affiliation [https://perma.cc/YT3E-W4QC] [hereinafter
Provincial Affiliation] (discussing the diocese’s reason for remaining independent of ACNA).
38 The Anglican Church of North America is itself a collection of organizations,
including the Reformed Episcopal Church. Ecumenical Relationships, THE
REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.recus.org/ecumenical.html [https://
perma.cc/3KPD-JLL9] (“The Reformed Episcopal Church is a subjurisdiction
of the Anglican Church of North America.”). Despite recognition by some individual Anglican churches, it has not been recognized by, and is not considered
a member of, the Anglican Communion. Jennifer Berry Hawes, Archbishop
says ACNA not part of the Anglican Communion, THE POST & COURIER (Oct. 8,
2014), https://www.postandcourier.com/features/faith_and_values/archbishop
-says-acna-not-part-of-the-anglican-communion/article_a954ad22-4f70-51ab-8
ed0-87273a9435c4.html [https://perma.cc/N3RJ-9V8A].
34
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of North America has subsequently associated itself with members
of the Southern Cone, which is composed largely of South American Anglican churches, and the Global Anglican Future Conference, which is composed largely of African Anglican churches. 39
This has created an international divide in the Anglican Communion,
falling mostly along lines of Western countries on one side and
developing countries on the other, with Africa and South America
(along with the Americans who have left the Episcopal Church)
aligning themselves against the “liberal” policies of the churches
in England, Europe, the United States, and Canada.40
These splits are not trivial in magnitude. Some commentators have claimed that winning the lawsuits and regaining property are empty victories for the Episcopal Church; its right may
be vindicated by the court, but it is left with little but empty buildings and rows of unused pews, slowly gathering dust.41 This is to
forget, however, that the assets held by many parishes are comprised significantly (if not mostly) of the value of the real estate
owned by the parish or diocese, which can be a significant sum.42
39

Pat Ashworth, Southern Cone offers haven to disaffected US dioceses,
CHURCH TIMES (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2007
/16-november/news/uk/southern-cone-offers-haven-to-disaffected-us-dioceses
[https://perma.cc/UYA8-2MPU]; Global Movement, GAFCON, https://www.gafcon
.org/about/global-movement [https://perma.cc/Y7SX-DVYU] (listing member
countries that include: Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Congo).
40 See generally HASSETT, supra note 23, at 2–4.
41 See, e.g., Why is the Episcopal Church near collapse?, BELIEFNET NEWS,
http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2012/07/why-is-the-episcopal-church
-near-collapse.php [https://perma.cc/2KX3-YUPB] (“the denomination is the
proud owner of scores of empty buildings nationwide—and liable for their upkeep in a depressed real estate market where empty church buildings are less
than prime property.”)
42 In 2011, Trinity Wall Street, reputed to be the wealthiest parish in the
country, estimated that it held over $2 billion in assets, including 14 acres of
Manhattan real estate and a 26-story skyscraper. Michelle Mazzarella, Plans
Approved for Trinity Church’s Community Center and Office Tower, CITY REALTY
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cityrealty.com/nyc/market-insight/features/future-nyc
/plans-approved-trinity-church039s-community-center-office-tower/14063 [https://
perma.cc/UH6X-3MCQ]; Sharon Otterman, Trinity Church Split on How to Manage $2 Billion Legacy of a Queen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/04/25/nyregion/trinity-church-in-manhattan-is-split-on-how-to
-spend-its-wealth.html; The Rector, Church-Wardens, and Vestrymen of Trinity
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At a time when the Episcopal Church has seen revenue growth
fail to outpace inflation, the availability of historical physical assets could make a dramatic difference in the ability of parishes to
consolidate and remain financially solvent in the future.43
II. HISTORY OF CHURCH PROPERTY-SPLITTING
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Watson v. Jones and the Development of Initial and
Subsequent Deferential Approaches
The Supreme Court first ruled on a church property dispute
in 1871.44 The members of Third, or Walnut Street, Presbyterian
Church in Louisville, Kentucky, disagreed over the church’s
stance on slavery after the Civil War, amongst other issues.45 An
election of elders by the pro-slavery faction was contested by the
anti-slavery faction.46 In the subsequent fallout, each faction
claimed ownership and control of the church property.47 The
Church, in the city of New York and Subsidiaries, Consolidated Financial Report, December 31, 2012 and 2011, TRINITY WALL STREET (Apr. 26, 2013),
https://www.trinitywallstreet.org/sites/default/files/Trinity-Wall-Street-2012
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HX-LE6P] (listing Trinity Wall Street’s financial
and real assets for the years 2011 and 2012). The Diocese of San Joaquin has
been reported to hold “tens of millions of dollars” in physical assets, mostly
composed of real estate. Pablo Lopez, Fresno appeals court says Episcopal
church properties must be returned, FRESNO BEE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.fres
nobee.com/news/local/article70375317.html [https://perma.cc /MD5B-B44U].
43 Between 2005 and 2015, total domestic income increased from $2,199,993,228
to $2,280,563,637, an increase of 3.66 percent. Fast Facts 2005, EPISCOPAL
CHURCH (2006), https://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/Episcopal_FAST_FACTS
_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2RQ-BYLR]; Fast Facts 2015, EPISCOPAL CHURCH
(2016), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/domestic_fast_facts_2015__0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BVP8-XUHV]. During the same period, United States domestic
inflation increased by a total of 23.44 percent, not seasonally adjusted. 10-Year
Breakeven Inflation Rate (T10YIE), ECONOMIC RESEARCH, FEDERAL RESERVE
OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE#0 [https://perma.cc
/RP8T-GDJQ].
44 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
45 Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847–48 (1998).
46 Id. at 1848–50.
47 Id. at 1848.

722 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:709
anti-slavery faction sued in federal court to recover title to the
church property.48 The Supreme Court, after extensive consideration of the constitutionality of ruling on such a case, advocated a
deferential approach.49 The Supreme Court recognized that many
church property disputes will be ultimately theological in nature,
and that American courts are barred on First Amendment grounds
from deciding such issues.50 Accordingly, the Supreme Court chose
to defer to the church in question and allow internal church tribunals
or decision-making apparatus to answer questions concerning
church property.51
In 1976, the Supreme Court heard Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich,
which concerned the removal of a bishop from his position.52 In
48

Id.
Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–35.
50 Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1844–45.
51 Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–35; see Hyden, supra note 5, at 546–48, 571 (discussing methods of application of the Watson decision).
52 Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976). There were several other ecclesiastical cases between Watson and
Milivojevich, but each applied the deferential approach as set out in Watson,
albeit with some clarifications and further discussion. See Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 137, 139 (1872) (applying a deferential standard to a dispute
over the alleged removal of elected trustees of a church); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (applying a deferential standard, eighty years after the original promulgation, to
a dispute over the rightful holder of the office of Archbishop in which one party
had been appointed by the Supreme Church Authority of the Russ. Orthodox
Church in Moscow, Russia, and the other had been appointed by a convention
of prelates from a number of Russian Orthodox churches in America). After
these less influential clarifications, the Court developed a set of “comprehensive
constitutional restrictions on civil involvement in church property disputes.”
Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1855. The first of the cases to begin this clarification was the 1969 decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, in which a number
of Presbyterian churches in Georgia withdrew from the national Presbyterian
Church in the United States for doctrinal and ecclesiological reasons and
wished to keep possession of the local church property. Presbyterian Church in
the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 441–44 (1969); see Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1855–57. The Court’s
decision argues that a neutral principles approach might resolve church property disputes, but doing so would risk “resolving underlying controversies over
religious doctrine,” something which is likely to arise in any dispute over church
49
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Milivojevich, the hierarchical Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church
was headquartered (at the time of the suit) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.53
In 1939, Milivojevich was created Bishop of the American-Canadian
diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, based in Illinois.54 The
Serbian Orthodox Church, after a series conflicts with Bishop
Milivojevich, removed him as Bishop and defrocked him in 1963.55
At the same time, the Serbian Orthodox Church split Milivojevich’s
former diocese into three dioceses and appointed new leadership.56 Milivojevich argued his removal and defrocking, and the
division of his former diocese, were arbitrary and in contradiction
to the Church’s internal canons and regulations, both procedurally
and substantively.57 These decisions were made by the Church’s
internal judiciary in Yugoslavia, and had been pronounced accordingly.58 The Milivojevich Court ostensibly applied the former
deferential standard, but with a noticeable difference.59 While still
adhering to the deferential approach in theory, the Supreme Court
created an opening for court interpretation in religious matters,
saying that courts could not decide a religious issue only when the
issue or conflict could not be resolved “without extensive inquiry by
civil courts into religious law and polity ....”60 The Supreme Court
did not affirmatively specify that courts could (or should) decide
church disputes, but the language employed significantly entailed
that the Court was opening the door to a future judicial role in
religious property disputes.61
separation related to alleged violations of doctrine. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull,
393 U.S. at 449.
53 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 699 (“The Serbian Orthodox Church, one of the
14 autocephalous, hierarchical churches which came into existence following
the schism of the universal Christian church in 1054, is an episcopal church
whose seat is the Patriarchate in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.”).
54 Id. at 701–02.
55 Id. at 704–07.
56 Id. at 703.
57 Id. at 706.
58 Id. at 704–06.
59 See generally id. at 708–26.
60 Id. at 709.
61 Id.; Kathleen E. Reeder, Whose Church Is It, Anyway? Property Disputes
and Episcopal Church Splits, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 142–43 (2006).
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B. Jones v. Wolf and the Application of “Neutral Principles
of Law”
After nearly one hundred years of applying the deferential
approach from Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court moved from
Watson to the modern “neutral principles of law” approach in
Jones v. Wolf.62 In 1979, a majority of the Vineville Presbyterian
Church in Macon, Georgia broke off from the Augusta-Macon
Presbytery of the national Presbyterian Church of the United
States.63 In doing so, the separating majority kept possession of
the church property and associated with another denomination.64
The dissenting minority, remaining under the Presbyterian Church
of the United States, sued to regain possession of the property.65
The Supreme Court decided that the appropriate method for courts
to resolve ecclesiastical property disputes was to apply a “neutral
principles of law” evaluation.66 Going beyond the speculative ruling in Milivojevich, the Supreme Court determined that courts
could examine “certain religious documents,” such as church canons or constitutions, and decide the case on the basis of these documents so long as doing so would not require the court to “resolve
a religious controversy.”67 If deciding the case would require the
Court to rule upon ecclesiastical questions, this would infringe
upon the separation of church and state, and the Court would be
obligated to return in the case to Watson-style deference.68
1. In re Episcopal Church Cases
In the Episcopal Church, the state of California is split into six
separate dioceses: (from north to south) Northern California, California, San Joaquin, El Camino Real, Los Angeles, and San Diego.69
62

Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id at 595.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 604.
68 Id.
69 General Convention Office, Provinces of the Episcopal Church, EPISCOPAL
HEALTH MINISTRIES (1998), http://www.episcopalhealthministries.org/files/file
63
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In 2006, when the first Episcopal Church property-splitting case
reached California courts, the Episcopal dioceses in California
had a total of 158,200 members.70 The California Supreme Court’s
first encounter with the twenty-first-century Episcopal Church
property-splitting cases took place in 2009 with In re Episcopal
Church Cases.71 This decision arose out of a conflict within St.
James Parish in the Diocese of Los Angeles.72 In 2004, the vestry
of St. James Parish voted to break from the Episcopal Church,
taking the parish’s real property with them, to the exclusion of
the Diocese.73 The Diocese responded by appointing a new rector
and asking the parish to surrender the church property; upon the
parish’s refusal, the Diocese filed suit to regain possession of the
property.74 While this was the first recent Episcopal Church property-splitting case heard by the California Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court had heard several property-splitting cases involving other denominations in the past.75 These cases, leading up to
/province-map.jpg [https://perma.cc/MT8S-6SBQ] (showing a geographic breakdown of the dioceses of the Episcopal Church).
70 Baptized Members by Province and Diocese 2005–2015, supra note 10.
71 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66 (Cal. 2009).
72 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
73 Id. A majority of the members of the parish voted for disaffiliation, but a
minority of members opposed the move. Id. Upon the vote to leave, the parish
amended its articles of incorporation, adopted upon joining the Episcopal Church
in 1949, to remove all references to the national Episcopal Church, including a
1958 diocesan canon stating that parish property would revert to the Diocese
on the dissolution of the parish. Id. at 850–51.
74 Id. The dissenting minority of the parish joined the Diocese in the suit.
Id. at 850.
75 Id. at 854–57. These cases included Baker v. Ducker, Wheelock v. First
Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles, and Horsman v. Allen. Id. Baker, an 1889
case, involved the First Reformed Church of Stockton, California, which incorporated as part of the Reformed Church, with the incorporation documents
specifically making reference to Calvinist theology. Some years later, the congregation had shifted to a largely Lutheran theological structure, and accordingly
changed the church’s incorporation to reflect this, renaming it the German Lutheran Zion Society. The remaining members of the Reformed tradition sued
to recover the property. Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365 (1889). Wheelock, an 1897
case, involved a dispute with the First Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles.
Upon receiving a sum of money, two parties within the church disputed the
way in which it should be used. The minority party appealed to the national
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the decision in Horsman, developed the deferential approach and
ended up closely mirroring the result from Watson.76 In subsequent
cases, the California Appellate Courts began to move towards the
neutral principles approach; tracking, with some delay, the changes
in the U.S. Supreme Court and leaving behind the former California
Supreme Court rulings which established the deferential approach
in the state.77 The seminal change came with In re Episcopal
Church Cases, in which the California Supreme Court explicitly
affirmed the use of the Jones “neutral principles of law” evaluation.78 This came after an extended period during which California
courts, mostly at the appellate level—though occasionally including the Supreme Court—had begun to lean towards a more interventionist approach to church property dispute litigation.79 In In
re Episcopal Church Cases, the California Supreme Court agreed
with the Appellate Court’s ruling, but felt that the Appellate Court
had placed too much emphasis on prior California rulings to the
exclusion of the more recent U.S. Supreme Court updates.80 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court decided to formally introduce
the neutral principles approach, stating that “to the extent the
court can resolve a property dispute without reference to church
doctrine, it should apply neutral principles of law.”81 In doing so,
Presbyterian Church’s tribunal, which ruled partially in favor of the minority
party and ordered the church to split into two congregations. The majority
party, which had control of the money, refused to pay. Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. 477 (1897). Horsman, a 1900 case,
involved a Church of the United Brethren in Christ in Tulare County. Two
parties emerged in the church, the “radicals” and the “liberals.” The national
church split along these lines, and the local branches followed. The “radicals”
in Tulare County sued to recover land held by the “liberals.” Horsman v. Allen,
129 Cal. 131 (1900).
76 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 854–56 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
77 Id. at 866–68.
78 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 73–74 (Cal. 2009).
79 See, e.g., Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Nonsectarian
Church, 39 Cal. 2d 121, 131 (1952) (noting that “[t]he general rule that courts
will not interfere in religious societies with reference to their ecclesiastical practices stems from the separation of the church and state, but has always been
qualified by the rule that civil and property rights would be adjudicated.”).
80 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d at 81.
81 Id. at 79.
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the court should consider “sources such as the deeds to the property in dispute, the local church’s articles of incorporation, the
general church’s constitution, canons, and rules ....”82 Applied to
St. James Parish, the court found that the parish’s early choice to
submit to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church
was dispositive.83 The Episcopal Church had altered its canons,
largely in response to Jones v. Wolf, to “[make] clear that a local
parish owns local church property in trust for the greater church
and may use that property only so long as the local church remains
part of the greater church.”84 St. James Parish had voluntarily
chosen to submit to these rules, and thus the parish property
rightfully belonged to the national church.85
C. Schofield v. Superior Court and Diocese of San Joaquin
v. Gunner
The story of the Diocese of San Joaquin is similar to that of
many breakaway Episcopal dioceses and parishes across the country. In an interview, the newly appointed Bishop of the Anglican
Diocese of San Joaquin (composed of former members of the Episcopal Church Diocese), Dr. Eric Vawter Menees, recounted the internal disputes that led up to the diocesan retreat from the Episcopal
Church.86 Dr. Menees described the ordination of Gene Robinson
as the catalyst of the secessionist movement in the Diocese. 87 He
cited a high level of support in the diocese for leaving the Episcopal Church, claiming that over ninety-five percent of the members
of the Diocese supported the decision to depart.88 In a statement
given at the Diocese’s 2007 convention, after which the Diocese voted
to leave the Episcopal Church, then-Bishop John-David Schofield
recounted watching the Episcopal Church “lose its way” for more
82

Id. at 70.
Id. at 82.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 86.
86 Scott Carpenter, Legal battle hinges on California’s High Court, UNION DEMOCRAT (July 6, 2016), http://www.uniondemocrat.com/localnews/4485344-151/le
gal-battle-hinges-on-californias-high-court [https://perma.cc/J5X2-6T25].
87 Id.
88 Id.
83
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than twenty years, “dismissing the word of God” and making “unilateral decisions about theology, sexuality, and ordination” which
cut it off from the rest of the Anglican Communion.89 Encouraged
by the example set by the string of parishes and dioceses breaking
off across the country, he urged the members of the Diocese to
vote for secession.90 On December 7, 2007, forty of the forty-seven
parishes in the Diocese voted to leave the Episcopal Church.91
Preparing a plan to leave as early as 2005, the Diocese had slowly
begun to amend its canons away from those of the national Episcopal Church, “in an attempt to protect its property” from future
seizure by the national church.92 On January 22, 2008, Schofield
amended the articles of incorporation for the Diocese, renaming
it “The Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin (A Corporation Sole).”93
Soon after, the Episcopal Church removed Bishop Schofield from
his office and elected Jerry Lamb as a provisional bishop of the
minority of parishes which did not secede.94 With diocesan approval, Lamb quickly proceeded to amend the Diocese’s articles of
incorporation again, revoking Schofield’s earlier changes.95 In response, Schofield began retitling the real property occupied by the
secessionist parishes to The Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin (A
Corporation Sole), and from there, granting the property to the
Anglican Diocese Holding Corporation; created by Schofield specifically as an attempt to protect the property from seizure.96 The
holding corporation explicitly listed itself as the Holding Corporation for the Diocese of San Joaquin, “a diocese ... of the Anglican
Province of the Southern Cone,” another (mostly South American)
portion of the Anglican Communion.97
89

Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 56 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016) (quoting John-David Schofield, Address to the Convention, Diocese of
San Joaquin (Dec. 7, 2007)).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 57.
92 Id. at 56.
93 Id. at 57.
94 Id. at 54.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 57.
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In April 2008, Lamb requested on behalf of the Episcopal
Diocese that Schofield return all real and personal property taken
by the secessionist parishes.98 After Schofield refused to do so, the
Episcopal Church and the Diocese joined in suing to recover the
property.99 After a number of amended complaints, the trial court
granted summary judgment to the Diocese.100 The trial court determined that the secessionist party’s actions (including the amendments to the Diocese’s governing documents) were “ultra vires and
impermissible under the constitution and canons of the national
church.”101 Schofield responded by filing a writ of mandamus.102
The appellate court determined that summary judgment was improper: any questions that required the court to determine whether
Schofield or Lamb was properly the bishop of the Diocese were
fundamentally religious in nature, and, thus, the court was
blocked from adjudication on First Amendment grounds.103 Aside
from this, however, civil jurisdiction was “properly invoked to resolve issues concerning property transfers” made by Schofield
while he was unquestionably the bishop.104 With this in mind, the
appellate court granted the writ and remanded the suit, instructing the trial court to determine any property disputes using neutral principles of law in line with Jones and the recently decided
Episcopal Church Cases.105
On remand, the trial court refused a second motion for summary judgment by the Diocese.106 Soon after, however, John-David
Schofield died before the case could be tried on remand; his personal
representative, Kevin Gunner, took Schofield’s place in the suit.107
98

Id.
Id.
100 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Schofield, No. 08 CECG 01425, 2009 WL
9442332, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 21, 2009).
101 Schofield v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
102 Id. at 161.
103 Id. at 165.
104 Id. at 166.
105 Id. at 166–67.
106 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Schofield, No. 08CECG01425, 2013 WL
7331710, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2013).
107 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 59 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016).
99
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After a full adjudication, the trial court ruled in favor of the Diocese
and the national church in an unreported 2013 opinion.108 Displeased with the results, Gunner appealed the decision, arguing,
inter alia, that the trial court failed to use the neutral principles
of law approach and “erred in deferring to the Episcopal Church’s
experts.”109 The California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District
agreed: the trial court, erroneously interpreting the appellate
court’s past opinion, did not apply neutral principles of law.110 Additionally, the trial court improperly decided to defer to the Episcopal Church as a hierarchical organization, thus accepting the
Church’s stance that a diocese may not unilaterally leave the
Episcopal Church.111 This decision requires “extensive inquiry
into church polity” and is thus beyond the court’s secular jurisdiction.112 Even if deference and the ecclesiastical determination
were appropriate, deciding whether or not a diocese may unilaterally leave the Church does not resolve the property dispute in
question.113 This left the appellate court to apply neutral principles of law on its own. The court dealt first with the Diocese’s real
property, and second with the Diocese’s personal property.114
As noted, the property of the Diocese was held in a corporation sole, and one purpose of using such an entity is to “ensure
108

Id.
Id. at 60. Gunner also argued that the Episcopal Church should be collaterally estopped from arguing that the trial court properly decided the case
because of an Episcopal Church property-splitting suit in Illinois. Diocese of
Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 14 N.E.3d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); see Gunner,
202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60. Quincy was decided soon after the remanded Schofield
trial court ruling, and involved another secessionist Diocese leaving with
church property. See generally Quincy, 14 N.E.3d at 1245. There, however, the
trial court ruled in favor of the breakaway group and the appellate court affirmed. Id. Despite the different result, the Gunner court determined that due
to differences in Illinois law, the method of incorporation of the Illinois diocese,
and the methods in which the Diocese of Quincy held title to its property, the
case did not present the “identical issue” required for collateral estoppel. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60–61.
110 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 61–62.
111 Id. at 63.
112 Id. (quoting Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 14 N.E.3d 1245,
1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)).
113 Id. at 63.
114 Id. at 66–67.
109
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the continuation of ownership of property dedicated to the benefit
of a religious organization that may be held in the name of its
titular head.”115 There is a clear distinction between the corporation itself and the current officeholder; the officeholder deals with
the assets only on behalf of the religious organization.116 So, while
Schofield remained chief officer of the corporation sole, he did not
have authority to make his amendment to the articles of incorporation because the religious organization governed by the corporation (here, the Diocese) had not authorized the amendment.117
Additionally, the canons of the Diocese stipulated the name of the
corporation sole. To effectively change the name, Schofield needed
to have the diocesan convention vote first to approve a change to
the canons and constitution, and after that change, vote to amend
the title of the corporation sole.118 Schofield’s first set of deed
grants were invalid because Schofield’s attempt to rename the
corporation sole failed; accordingly, when he granted the deeds to
the “Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin,” no organization of this
name actually existed.119 Schofield’s later transfer of the deeds from
the new corporation sole to the Anglican Diocese Holding Company
was also null because the ability to transfer to the Holding Company
was contingent upon the transfer to the corporation sole being successful.120 After this point, all transfers made by Schofield were invalid because he had been removed from his position as bishop,
and with that his position as incumbent of the corporation sole.121
The personal property involved in the dispute was the money
held in the Diocese’s investment accounts at Merrill Lynch.122
Schofield created a new account with Merrill Lynch in the name
of his holding company, and instructed Merrill Lynch to transfer
the diocesan investment accounts to his new account.123 These
transfers came after Schofield had been removed from his position,
115

Id. at 65.
Id. at 65.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 66–67.
120 Id. at 67.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
116
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and, thus, he lacked the authority to make these transfers.124 Having gone through the neutral principles of law analysis, the court
determined that all property—both real and personal—remained
with the Diocese and the Episcopal Church, and accordingly affirmed
the trial court’s judgment.125
III. IMPROVING NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
The agonizing division amongst the Anglican Communion
continues, but as of the writing of this Note, the spree of property
litigation—and to some extent the attempts of large property-holding
groups to leave the Episcopal Church—seems to have died down.126
Accordingly, it seems an appropriate time to reflect back upon some
of the early suggestions concerning ways to improve the Episcopal
Church property-splitting litigation, and to examine the extent to
which these suggestions were, or were not, considered during the
subsequent litigation.
A. Scholarship and Suggestions
Many years before the current Episcopal Church property-splitting controversies began, scholarly articles began weighing
in with suggested improvements and changes to the Jones v. Wolf
neutral principles of law approach.127 Numerous commentators
who believed this approach to be problematic offered solutions, or if
not solutions, at least alleged improvements to the current law
and process surrounding church property litigation. Some focused
on leaving behind the framework of the neutral principles approach and either prescribing an alternative system, or removing
the decision from the courts entirely.128 Alternatively, others argued
124

Id.
Id.
126 Compare search results for “Anglican Communion Property Litigation”
between January 1, 2017 and January 1, 2018, GOOGLE [https://perma.cc/AP6A
-Z64E], with “Anglican Communion Property Litigation” between January 1,
2015 and January 1, 2016, GOOGLE [https://perma.cc/M3GC-SCVT].
127 See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1986).
128 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1843 (1998); Calvin Massey, Church
Schisms, Church Property, and Civil Authority, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23 (2010).
125
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for keeping the neutral principles approach, but making changes
to reach a more equitable system.129 The number and variety of
the suggestions make it unreasonable to discuss even a substantial portion of them in a paper of this length. Accordingly, this
analysis selects a number of the suggestions which would potentially be applicable within the current neutral principles doctrine.
These suggestions mainly concern adding additional factors or
considerations to the adjudication process with a hope of, it would
seem, removing some of the alleged institutional bias inherent in
the neutral principles doctrine. The discussion will focus on the
suggestions of two specific papers: Whose Church Is It, Anyway?
by Kathleen Reeder130 and Welcome to the Episcopal Church, Now
Please Leave by R. Gregory Hyden.131
1. Reeder
Reeder’s paper is the earlier of the two, and Hyden draws
from it in his work.132 Reeder argues that the neutral principles
approach to Episcopal Church property-splitting leads to a “foregone conclusion” in which the national Church and diocese retain
ownership of the diocesan property.133 This, Reeder believes, is
unjust, because the parishes “often lose the very properties they have
purchased, improved, and maintained.”134 Accordingly, she offers
five “salient factors” which, she argues, courts should consider in
adjudicating Episcopal Church property disputes. 135 The five factors are: 1) assessments to the diocese; 2) the purchase and maintenance of property; 3) expectations of parishioner-donors; 4) change
in membership between approval of the canons and present-day
disputes; and 5) the lack of bargaining power for new churches.136
129

See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Application of “Neutral Principles” in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes,
32 ST. LOUIS L.J. 263 (1987).
130 Reeder, supra note 61.
131 Hyden, supra note 5.
132 Id. at 542 n.8.
133 Reeder, supra note 61, at 157.
134 Id. at 158.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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2. Hyden
Hyden argues that “courts either do not understand or
simply ignore the role the wider Anglican Communion plays in
Episcopal polity.”137 To Hyden, this is, in fact, the “greatest shortcoming” of the Episcopal Church property-splitting lawsuits.138
Hyden makes general suggestions for improving the litigation
process, but sums up recommendations by saying that within the
Anglican context, the flexibility of his recommendations should
allow courts to “determine the living structure between the parish
and the Episcopal Church within the Anglican Communion.”139 The
only one of Hyden’s “principles” which explicitly brings in a consideration of the Anglican Communion is the second principle.140
This principle suggests that courts adopt the “Living Relationship
Test” from the Ohio Appellate Court, which “looks beyond ordinary indicia of property ownerships expressed in deeds, articles
of incorporation and like documents, and examines the rituals
and practices of the church in dispute to determine the governmental relationship or polity prevailing.”141 This would allow
courts to consider a parish’s refusal to pay annual assessments to
the national church, their refusal to accept their bishop’s authority, and other actions which show their “desire to not remain loyal
to the diocese.”142 This would also allow courts to “give weight to
the fact” that some secessionist Episcopal parishes realigned
themselves with other parts of the Anglican Communion.143 Because of this realignment, Hyden argues that the property in contest “is not being withdrawn from the international church.”144

137

Hyden, supra note 5, at 563.
Id.
139 Id. at 572.
140 Id. at 571–72.
141 Id. at 570–71 (quoting S. Ohio State Exec. Offices of Church of God v.
Fairborn Church of God, 573 N.E.2d 172, 182–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)).
142 Id. at 571.
143 Id.
144 Id.
138
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B. Utilization and Non-Utilization of Suggestions in the
Gunner/Schofield Controversy
1. Reeder
In Gunner, the appellate court was required to redo the entire neutral principles of law application that the trial court failed
to perform,145 so if Reeder’s factors would come into play, the
court’s application should be visible here. However, the first problems with Reeder’s suggestions appear in their very applicability
to Gunner and other similar property-splitting suits. Reeder assumes that courts will “rely heavily on the ... implied trust doctrine.”146 Thus, Reeder’s factors are tailored to a court examining
the presence or absence of an implied trust.147 But in Gunner, the
court expressly rejects this approach.148 “Implying a trust almost
inevitably puts the civil courts squarely in the midst of ecclesiastical controversies,” forcing courts “to determine which faction
continued to adhere to the ‘true’ faith.”149 Doing so would put
courts expressly into prohibited ecclesiastical territory.150 Since
no implied trust is at issue in the case, it is therefore unsurprising
that the Gunner court does not consider any of Reeder’s factors.151
2. Hyden
In the Gunner opinion, and the opinions leading up to it,
there is no mention of the Anglican Communion.152 This, of course,
comports with Hyden’s statement that courts often “simply ignore” the role of the Anglican Communion.153 The court in Gunner
145 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d

51, 62 (Cal. Ct. App.

2016).
146

Reeder, supra note 61, at 157.
Id. at 157–58.
148 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See generally Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
152 See id.; Schofield v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
153 Hyden, supra note 5, at 563.
147
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(following the California Supreme Court) also did not employ the
Living Relationship Test that Hyden advocates.154 Unlike Reeder’s
suggestions, Hyden’s suggestion would at least be applicable in
Gunner if the court had chosen to use it because the breakaway
parishes of the Diocese of San Joaquin realigned with a group
composed of members of the Anglican Communion.155
C. Theoretical Efficacy of the Suggested Improvements
1. Reeder
The factors that Reeder suggests vary in hypothetical difficulty of application. The first four are parish- or diocese-specific—
assessments to the diocese, the purchase and maintenance of
property, expectations of parishioner-donors, and change in membership between approval of the canons and present-day disputes—
while the last, the lack of bargaining power for new churches, is a
generalization presumably based on the age of the parish.156
The expectations of parishioner-donors is perhaps the most
difficult to apply. As Reeder notes, only the intentions of presently
living donors who are currently active participants in the parish
are readily measurable.157 Considering that some parishes in the
United States have been in existence for over 350 years, the current donors have likely made only a fraction of the donations that
have contributed to the parish’s assets over time.158 Also, as seen
in Gunner, many of the Episcopal Church parishes in the central
and western parts of the United States started as missions, in
which existing dioceses and parishes would provide funds to start
parishes in newly settled areas.159 Looking at the intent of donors
in such a situation would be particularly difficult. Additionally,
funding for many of the parishes in the original English colonies
in North America came from the Church of England and voluntary societies run by English citizens, such as the SPCK and the
154 Compare Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d, with Hyden, supra note 5, at 570–71.
155

Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 57.
Reeder, supra note 61, at 158–59.
157 Id. at 163–64.
158 HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra note 4, at 16.
159 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55.
156
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SPG.160 This complicated history of donations,161 presumably not
well-documented, would make any analysis of donor intent extremely messy; based on availability bias,162 it seems likely that
such an analysis would skew heavily in favor of recent donors.
Every court considering such a factor would have to make a choice
regarding whom to include in its expectations analysis. Hyden
raises very similar concerns about Reeder’s suggestion to look at
the intent of donors.163 Reeder is entirely unconcerned about such
bias: the “interests of temporally distant owners are not the primary concern.”164 This is, of course, a value judgment. However,
even if historical donors are set aside, a hypothetical should illustrate that this exclusion does not solve the problems inherent in
the suggestion.
Suppose a parish has 100 members. Among these parishioners, there is one major donor who has given several million
dollars to the parish, while the other 99 members have each given
less than $100 per year. If this was the status quo at the time of
the property-splitting adjudication, how would a court evaluate
the expectations of these parishioner-donors? Reeder, for some
reason, thinks that this choice should be “fairly straightforward,”
but fails to provide even an inkling of how this process should
work.165 Should each parishioner get one vote? This would ignore
that the vast majority of donated money came from one person.
Should votes be allocated by amount donated? This seems undemocratic, and figuring out just how much each parishioner donated
could be difficult, especially in parishes with lifelong members
who have donated over the course of seventy years, or more. What
if the single major donor had a well-known preference, but had
died or left the parish prior to adjudication? Even without this
extreme distribution in donations, problems still remain. Should
members who do not donate get a vote? Should donors who are
not members get a vote? Should people who have been members
of the parish for many years get more votes than members who
160

HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra note 4, at 16, 22, 35–41.
See id. at 38.
162 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 163.
163 Hyden, supra note 5, at 564–65.
164 Reeder, supra note 61, at 163.
165 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 163.
161
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joined less than a week before litigation? Do children get votes?
Do clergy get to vote? And once vote allocation has been decided,
what would the standard be for determining expectations? Should
a majority control the decision? A supermajority? A unanimous
vote? Deciding any one of these questions could have a dramatic
impact on the court’s analysis, and could swing the expectations
wildly in one way or another. But Reeder provides no indication
of how this should work.
Reeder’s next factor is assessments to dioceses.166 Her argument is roughly that the “voluntary” nature of assessments to
dioceses, if examined by courts, would show that parishes have
autonomy on a day-to-day basis, and, thus, courts should be willing to give the parishes control over property after succession.167
It is unclear why this day-to-day autonomy would have any impact on a hypothetical court’s decision, and Reeder does not provide any explanation. It is well known that the Episcopal Church
tends to delegate the majority of its power to the parish level.168
This delegation, however, does nothing to change the fundamental polity and power structure of the Episcopal Church.169 Nor
does it do anything to change the contractual relationships which
govern the operation of the parishes and dioceses.170 Reeder
would have courts focus on this nebulous concept of autonomy,171
presumably to the exclusion of explicit, easily ascertainable contractual relationships.
Reeder’s next factor asks courts to look at the name under
which property is held, and the source of funding which allowed
for the creation of the buildings.172 Reeder believes that “[i]t
would be manifestly unjust if the diocese held legal ownership of
166

Reeder, supra note 61, at 159.
See id. at 160 (noting that the funds generated from assessments are
voluntary commitments).
168 See Governance of the Episcopal Church, supra note 6 (describing the
governance structure of the Episcopal Church).
169 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 160.
170 See Governance of the Episcopal Church, supra note 6 (describing the
governance structure of the Episcopal Church).
171 Reeder, supra note 61, at 161 (“Courts could give this day-to-day autonomy more weight in the resolution of church property matters.”).
172 Id.
167
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real property that the parish wholly financed.”173 Reeder cites a
restaurant franchise example in an explanatory footnote for this
factor.174 Again, this would favor a nebulous concept of intent over
the actual contractual relationship which the diocese and parishes
agreed to. The franchise argument, while interesting, is not a particularly viable parallel. Notably, the franchise in question presumably did not agree to a contract which placed ownership of its
property in implied trust with the franchisor, as courts have often
found to be the case in the Episcopal Church’s Dennis Canon.175
Reeder also bases her argument on an assumption that parishes
generally fund the creation of their own buildings without outside
monetary support.176 This may be accurate in some cases, but as
noted above, the presence of foreign donations, grants from the national Church, and current or past mission-status of many parishes directly contradicts this assumption in many cases.177 The
California Supreme Court, commenting on the exact concern that
Reeder raises, concludes that “[a]lthough the deeds to the property have long been in the name of the local church, that church
agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of the greater
church and to be bound by its governing documents.”178
Reeder’s final two factors are Change in Membership between Approval of Canons and Present-Day Disputes and Lack of
Bargaining Power for Missions.179 Both factors essentially involve
a claim that the present membership of the parish in question
may not have freely consented to the canons of the Episcopal
Church. In the former, this lack of consent is based on potential
changes in membership, so that the current members did not vote
for the diocese adopting the canons.180 In the latter, the lack of
consent is based on the idea that new parishes have no real choice
173 Id. (asserting that Episcopal churches frequently purchased real property and structures without assistance from the diocese).
174 Id. at 161 n.173.
175 Id. at 126–27.
176 Id. at 162.
177 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 70 (Cal. 2009).
178 Id.
179 Reeder, supra note 61, at 158–59.
180 See id. at 164–65.
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in joining the Episcopal Church, have no ability to join a diocese
other than the one in which they are geographically located, and
have no legal expertise to understand the property indications of
the contract into which they are entering.181 These two factors
suffer from the fewest flaws because, unlike the other factors,
they provide reasons why a court should deviate from a contractual basis, rather than merely tossing the contract out in favor of
other factors without explanation. Nonetheless, these factors are
not without difficulties. It is true that members who joined a parish
after the parish voted to join the Episcopal Church and adopt its
canons did not themselves vote on these decisions. Reeder argues
that this lack of personal voting should be interpreted—or at least
can be interpreted—as a lack of consent to the canons in question.182 This lack of consent would apparently render the canons
unenforceable.183 That seems unusual; this is, after all, a voluntary organization, and one with a number of available substitutes.184 Because the canons were already in place, these new
members, had they wished to investigate the matter, could have
fairly easily determined the rules which governed the parish’s relationship to its diocese and to the Episcopal Church.185 The fact
that the individual parish is associated with the larger Episcopal
Church should be fairly obvious, even if one looks no further than
the similarities in styling akin to a trademark.186 Because this is
not a difficult connection to make, it would be odd to entirely excuse compliance with a contract on the basis that some members
of an organization failed to inquire into the rules governing the
organization.187 This also comes back to issues involved with some
181

See id. at 166–67.
Id. at 164–65.
183 See id.
184 Id. at 165.
185 See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 55 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016).
186 See id.
187 See id. (discussing the governing structure of the Episcopal church);
Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit
Directors?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 930 (2003) (discussing how state statutes
tend to give non-profits “complete freedom in establishing criteria for membership and in determining what rights ... the members are to have.”); id. at 947
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of Reeder’s other factors: why would a court be concerned with the
lack of voting by particular members of the parish?188 The parish
is a separate entity from its members, and the canons of the Church
control the relationship not between the members of a parish and
the diocese, but between the parish as a separate entity and the
diocese.189 If this is the case, inquiry into member voting preferences would be fruitless.
The bargaining power argument strikes a very different
note. While not actually describing the adoption of diocesan rules
as unconscionable, Reeder begins discussion of this factor with
the idea of unconscionability.190 Under contract law, unconscionability is an extreme standard, embodied in words such as a contract which “no man ... not under delusion would make” and
“which no fair and honest man would accept.”191 Clearly, parishes
in the not-too-distant past voluntarily, and with full knowledge,
voted to adopt these canons.192 If Reeder actually intends to call
such agreements unconscionable, this is an extraordinary leap.
Even if Reeder does not intend a full labelling of unconscionability, her argument still assumes a sort of duress which forces new
parishes into agreement with the canons of the Episcopal
Church.193 She describes the Episcopal Church as being “[i]n some
sense ... a monopoly supplier.”194 This is a curious claim. The Episcopal Church does not claim to be the only Christian organization
(discussing the quasi-contractual relationship between donors and non-profit
directors).
188 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 165.
189 See id. at 130 (discussing the relationship between the parish and diocese); id. at 154 (stating that individual churches do not automatically assent
to new canons. Canons are enacted and amended by a concurrent vote of the
House of Deputies, comprised of clergy and laity, and the House of Bishops,
comprised of bishops of all dioceses.).
190 Id. at 166.
191 Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889).
192 Reeder, supra note 61, at 164–65 (“[A] parish membership’s consent at
a given point in time to abide by the rule of the canons should not be read as a
blanket agreement to the canons for all time, especially as the membership of
the church changes.”).
193 Id. at 165 (“Dead hands cannot maintain an infinite grip, especially in
a voluntary organization such as a church.”).
194 Id. at 166.
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with valid orders, demonstrated by its relation to other Anglican
churches and its ecumenical efforts.195 Additionally, there are a
variety of denominations, both Anglican and non-Anglican, which
structure their worship and daily life in a manner similar to that
of the Episcopal Church.196 Had they wished to, the new parishes
which Reeder is concerned about could have joined the exact same
organizations that the departing parishes of San Joaquin
joined.197 Reeder even tacitly acknowledges this point in the same
paragraph where she ascribes the monopoly, saying in her footnote that some “U.S. parishes have left the Episcopalian Church
in the U.S. and have joined ... [the Anglican] church in Nigeria ...
[and] in Rwanda, Uganda, and various provinces in Latin America.”198 On grounds of both unconscionability and presumed monopoly power, Reeder’s argument for bargaining power is weak at
best.
There is perhaps also a corporate law analogy to be made
in opposition to Reeder’s factors as a whole, though it is admittedly
imprecise. Many non-profit organizations have come to be organized as corporations under various state laws.199 Though different
from corporations used by other non-profits, the corporation sole
used by the Diocese of San Joaquin bears some similarity.200 When
donors contribute to a non-profit corporation, they are owed certain duties, as in for-profit corporate law, though these standards
are somewhat relaxed.201 Beyond enforcing these duties, donors
are not able to choose what happens to their funds.202 The officers
of the non-profit organization control the decision making.203 If, despite the delegation of power, the Episcopal Church has a unitary
195 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 125 (discussing the Episcopal Church’s participation in interdenominational societies).
196 Id.; Ecumenical Relationships, supra note 38 (discussing the Reformed
Episcopal Church); Provincial Affiliation, supra note 37 (discussing consideration of joining the ACNA).
197 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 166 n.186.
198 Id.
199 See Lee, supra note 187, at 930.
200 See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 67 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016).
201 See Lee, supra note 187, at 925.
202 See id. at 949.
203 Id. at 958 n.190 (discussing non-profit control).
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polity, the concentration of power surely bears some resemblance
to the corporate structure.204 The individual dioceses are asked to
vote to approve changes to the governing documents of the diocese, as are corporate shareholders.205 No matter how much a group
of shareholders in the non-profit corporation wants to leave, the
shareholders agreed to the corporate bylaws when they contributed funds, knowing that they would be unable to regain their
donations.206 The continuance or discontinuance of donations, the
expectations of the donors, and the changes in the pool of donors
contributing to the organization would have absolutely no effect
on the shareholders’ ability to take control of their own funds over
the objection of the corporation.207
When Reeder describes what the courts currently consider
in Church property-splitting suits, the list of documents and facts
that she lays out mimics the list of documents that would be considered in litigation over a non-profit corporation, mutatis mutandis:
“church canons, the articles of incorporation, and perhaps a few
other secular documents such as property deeds.”208 Presumably,
Reeder does not envision her factors applying to non-church property disputes. If donors and members of a non-profit corporation—
say, the ACLU—decided that the ACLU no longer represented
their views, and thus chose to go to their local ACLU office, load
up a truck with the office’s furniture, computers, and other property—which were, of course, paid for with these member-donors’
funds—and cart them away, it is difficult to imagine a court pondering the “expectations” of the member-donors when deciding
whether or not to return the furniture to the ACLU. As noted before, this is an admittedly imprecise metaphor. It demonstrates,
however, that if Reeder’s factors are to be considered plausible,
there must be a relevant legal difference between a non-profit corporation and the Episcopal Church’s polity. Reeder relies upon
204 Reeder, supra note 61, at 155 (arguing that the Episcopal Church should

act more like a corporation than a democratic government).
205 Lee, supra note 187, at 930 (discussing that non-profits are made up of
members who have voting power akin to shareholders); Governance of the Episcopal Church, supra note 6 (discussing how diocesan conventions vote on major
policy decisions of the diocese).
206 See Lee, supra note 187, at 946 n.127, 949.
207 See id. at 946–47.
208 Reeder, supra note 61, at 158.
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the appearance of the Church’s polity to the exclusion of the actual polity.209 Just as a corporate board of directors can delegate
power to local branches without losing any of its controlling power
over those branches, the General Assembly of the Episcopal Church
has tended to delegate power to the parishes and dioceses, but has
firmly and unquestionably maintained power as a unitary polity.210
Correcting this errant assumption about the Church, and maintaining the assumption that Reeder’s factors would be largely
misguided if applied to other non-profit corporations, it is difficult
to imagine a relevant legal difference that would justify the application of these rules to ecclesiastical property but not to other
property held by a non-profit.
2. Hyden
Reading Hyden’s argument, it appears—though it is not
explicitly stated—that he believes introducing considerations of
the Anglican Communion into court proceedings will yield results
in favor of the secessionist dioceses and parishes.211 In recent
years, the Anglican Communion has become known for its tumultuous volatility, and some more pessimistic news sources continue
to constantly herald its demise.212 Hyden portrays the Anglican
Communion as a hierarchical structure, and he characterizes it
as a structure that has authority over the Episcopal Church.213
To support the claim that the Anglican Communion operates with
authority, Hyden cites documents created by bodies within the
Anglican Communion.214 Apparently, these documents are intended
209

Id.

210 See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 55 (quoting James A. Dator, The Government

of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America: Confederal, Federal, or Unitary? 245 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University)).
211 Hyden, supra note 5, at 572.
212 See, e.g., Andrew Brown, The Anglican Schism Over Sexuality Marks the
End of the Global Church, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/08/anglican-schism-sexuality-end-global-church
-conservative-african-leaders-canterbury [https://perma.cc/BM92-SGDB] (alleging
that the 2016 Primates Meeting, which did not end the Communion’s schism,
would be the “funeral” of the Anglican Communion).
213 Hyden, supra note 5, at 565–66.
214 Id. at 567–68.
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to show authority, but it is not entirely clear why this is the case.
Hyden quotes a document, just before those citations, which
states decisions from a body of the Anglican Communion “do not
have canonical force,” but merely have “moral authority.”215 In
other words, they have no authority. Nothing in the cited passages acts to counter this assertion. Hyden quotes a report from
a body of the Anglican Communion which contains “recommendations” which “ask” the Episcopal Church to respond,216 and another
report in which the body “request[s]” and “urge[s]” the Episcopal
Church to act in a certain way.217 For an organization that supposedly holds power over a subordinate Episcopal Church, this is
surprisingly non-authoritative language. The system of organization is certainly hierarchical, as Hyden establishes,218 but attempting to ascribe “authority” to it is misplaced. In fact, one does
not have to go any further than the menu of the Anglican Communion website to find that the only authority that the Anglican
Communion as a body maintains is the authority to make “recommendations” which are intended to “guide[ ]” the actions of the
members of the Communion.219
Another aspect of potential authority could be the authority to remove a member church from the Anglican Communion,
which is certainly true, but beyond this the Anglican Church has
no ability to influence the ongoing activities of a member such as
the Episcopal Church.220 Not all churches that present themselves
as Anglican are members of the Anglican Communion, so membership is arguably not an integral part of the identity of any particular church. And, as noted above, the potential fracture of the
Communion has been considered imminent by some commentators
for at least the past decade,221 and this threat will likely continue
215

Id. at 566 (quoting LAMBETH COMMISSION ON COMMUNION, THE WINDSOR
REPORT 2004 app. 1 at 61 (2004), http://www.anglicancommunion.org/media
/68225/windsor2004full.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ5L-9MSL].
216 Id. at 566–67.
217 Id. at 567–68.
218 Id. at 565–66.
219 Structures, ANGLICAN COMMUNION OFFICE (2017), http://www.anglicancom
munion.org/structures.aspx [https://perma.cc/29N6-5GXX].
220 Id.
221 Reeder, supra note 61, at 126.

746 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:709
into the future as members of the Communion continue to struggle with many of the issues from which the controversy has
arisen.222 Thus, one of the foundational claims of Hyden’s argument seems to be a mischaracterization.
Setting aside this doubt, however, it is unclear whether or
not a court’s consideration of the role of the Anglican Communion
would actually change the outcome of a property-splitting suit.
The Living Relationship Test that Hyden proposes courts adopt
requires courts to set aside the standard documents seen in neutral principles analysis, such as “deeds, articles of incorporation
and like documents,” and instead decide the suit based on an examination of “the rituals and practices of the churches in dispute
to determine the governmental relationship or polity prevailing.”223 With this approach, there is the danger—as seen in the
discussion of Reeder224—that the court would mistake the grant
of authority by the General Assembly of the Episcopal Church for
a confederal polity.225 Hyden, though, envisions two specific facts
from a parish’s rituals and practices to be included in adjudication: first, a parish’s expression that it does not desire to remain
loyal to its diocese, as manifested in the parish’s refusal to pay
annual assessments to the diocese or national church and/or its
refusal to accept the diocesan bishop’s authority; and second, if
the parish leaves the Episcopal Church but realigns “with another Anglican Church,” which means that it “remains within the
Anglican Communion” and thus does not have its property “withdrawn from the international church.”226 The first consideration
raises similar concerns to those seen in Reeder, in that it involves
asking why a court should set aside an established contractual
relationship in favor of a loosely defined and newly developed
preference.227 The second is a more interesting suggestion, but the
actual application of this principle is difficult to envision. Suppose
that a court deciding a property-splitting suit acknowledges that
a parish has realigned with a different member of the Anglican
222

Brown, supra note 212.
Hyden, supra note 5, at 570–71.
224 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 159.
225 Id.
226 Hyden, supra note 5, at 571.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 166–71.
223
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Communion after its succession from the Episcopal Church. What
does it do next? This certainly is not a trivial fact, but how exactly
is a court supposed to “give weight” to this affiliation? Prior to
realignment, the parish likely had very little, if any, contact with
other members of the Anglican Communion, and the parish most
likely gave very little attention at all to the loosely affiliated international group of churches which meets only periodically. Presumably, the weight given to the realignment is supposed to go in
favor of the parish’s ownership of church property, but why? And,
if this realignment goes in favor of the parish’s ownership, is a
parish which leaves the Episcopal Church but chooses to realign
with an Anglican Church that is not a member of the Anglican
Communion more deserving of having its property taken away?
What if a parish continues to call itself Anglican but does not realign with any group? What if a parish realigns with a different
denomination, perhaps becoming an Anglican Rite Roman Catholic Church? Would a parish that continued in an Anglican style
be favorable to one which, say, opted for a Lutheran affiliation?
Introducing the role of the Anglican Communion into adjudication provides no clear answers, nor a clearly appropriate amount
of probative value, and seemingly opens the door to a variety of
questions related to denominational alignment which courts are
likely not prepared to deal with.
The suggestions made by Reeder and Hyden both contribute to the discussion about church property-splitting cases,228 but,
as demonstrated, straying from a mere evaluation of documents
would place a court in position in which it has to decide a number
of crucial questions.229 These questions, as suggested above,230 are
fraught with difficulty when it comes to actual application. For
most, it is unclear how any court could possibly make a systematic
decision on a particular question that would maintain applicability
across cases. If this is not possible, the suggested improvements
place courts in the situation of having to make potentially arbitrary distinctions and denotations and having to assign probative
228

See Hyden, supra note 5, at 568–72; Reeder, supra note 61, at 167–68.
See Hyden, supra note 5, at 570; Reeder, supra note 61, at 171.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 157–71; see also discussion supra
following note 227.
229
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value more or less at whim.231 In contrast, the neutral principles
approach requires very little of this: it concerns tangible pieces of
documentary evidence and asks courts to perform analysis on topics with which they have a high degree of familiarity.232 When
such a possibility remains open to courts, it is hard to see why a
court would choose either set of suggested improvements.
CONCLUSION
Leading up to much of the contentious Episcopal Church
property-splitting litigation, a number of scholars proposed ways
in which they believed that the doctrine of neutral principles of
law could be improved.233 These proposals largely hinged on asking courts to take more factors into consideration when deciding
the lawsuits.234 The hope, it would seem, was that the introduction of additional factors and considerations would provide a more
just result for the schismatic parties, even if this came at the cost
of muddling the decisions and potentially creating conflicting rulings on similar facts.235 Gunner, as—for the moment—one of the
last Episcopal Church property-splitting suits and therefore the
decision with the most commentary and case law available, provides a convenient demarcation to examine whether any of the
proposed additions were actually taken into account. While some
of the topics of these suggestions were introduced into the court
decisions, their introduction was largely fleeting and did not seem
to strongly influence the court’s decision-making process.236 This,
therefore, brings another question to the front: considering the
minimal impact of the factors that were included, if these proposals had all been applied in Gunner, would they have made any
difference to the outcome? As noted above, the introduction of extraneous factors would, if nothing else, remove the institutionally
driven clarity that exists in the current neutral principles approach.
231 See, e.g., Kyle D. Gobel, Note, Holiman v. Dovers: An Argument for a More
In-depth Analysis of Religious Disputes, 43 IND. L. REV. 1287, 1288, 1288–89 n.13
(2010) (noting inconsistent decisions by Arkansas courts in religious disputes).
232 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
233 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
235 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 129, at 311, 316.
236 See supra Section III.B.
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However, this uncertainty aside, there is not a compelling reason
to think that the proposals would have had a consistent dispositive
impact. The additional considerations, while perhaps providing some
support for the Schofield party, do not propose anything compelling. There is no consistent way to determine intentions considering
the history of the diocese, and while an organizational realignment to another party in the Anglican Communion did take place,
there is no provided reason why this realignment should preempt
one national church’s canon law in favor of another, especially
with the decentralized nature of the Anglican Communion. As long
as the neutral principles of law approach is applied in its current
manner, the results are likely to remain consistent with those of
the past, even if courts were to fully take into account the entire
range of proposed factors.

